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Abstract
Sharp declines in wealth-concentration occurred across Europe and the US during the 20th
century. But this stylized fact is based on declared wealth. It is possible that today the richest
are not less rich but rather that they are hiding much of their wealth. This paper proposes
a method to measure this hidden wealth, in any form. In England, 1920-1992, elites are
concealing 20-32% of their wealth. Among dynasties, hidden wealth, independent of declared
wealth, predicts appearance in the Offshore Leaks Database of 2013-6, house values in 1999,
and Oxbridge attendance, 1990-2016. Accounting for hidden wealth eliminates one-third of the
observed decline of top 10% wealth-share over the past century.
JEL: N00, N33, N34, D31, H26
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1 Introduction
The 20th century’s ‘Great Equalization’ of wealth in Europe and the United States was the result of
the decline of the top wealth-shares. In England the wealth-share of the top 1% transformed from
over 75%, in 1900, to less than 20% by 1970. Figure 1.1 collects the principal candidate elements
in explaining why this happened. In short, new wealth created by the post-war ‘Golden Age’ of
economic growth grew faster than net-of-taxes returns on capital (Piketty (2014), p.362-3).
We base this stylized fact primarily upon observed, or declared, wealth. But the incentive to
hide wealth exploded over the 20th century. In the 1950s, the top rate of estate tax was around
80%. Is the ‘Great Equalization’ of wealth an illusory characterization of the wealth distribution?
A simple result of an increased tendency for elites to hide their riches?
Declared wealth-at-death data is the primary source for our understanding of the 20th century
wealth distribution in England (Atkinson and Harrison, 1978; Atkinson et al., 1989; Atkinson, 2013;
Alvaredo et al., 2018). Since 1858, the individual details of wealth-at-death have been centrally
recorded in the Principal Probate Registry Calendars. Using a 100% sample of this data, 1892-1992,
this paper presents a method to estimate hidden wealth.1
I deﬁne ‘hidden’ wealth as wealth missing from the perspective of the probate calendars, and
therefore the tax authorities. A portion of this will be legal portfolio re-arrangement to tax-exempt
trusts, inter-vivos bequests, charitable donations, gifts to non-family members, and a portion will
potentially be illegal tax evasion.
The method is a simple accounting exercise that exploits the nominal, individual level data.
The key identifying assumption is that wealth declared before 1920 was a more accurate measure
of the ‘true’ wealth of a dynasty than declared wealth after 1920. The incentives suggest that this
is reasonable; taxes on wealth before 1920 were a tiny fraction of taxes after 1920.
During the low tax era, 1892-1920, I sum declared wealth at death, by dynasty. I then calculate
an expected ﬂow of inherited wealth that should show up in those same dynasties after 1920. For
most, wealth after 1920 is in excess of that predicted by the inheritance ﬂow from 1892-1920. This
is newly created wealth. However, for certain dynasties, declared wealth is systematically below
expected wealth from inheritance. This is hidden wealth.2
Let us take the Axxxxxxx family as a concrete case study to illustrate the method (I have
anonomysed the name).3 In the 1881 census of England and Wales, there are 39 people with the
surname Axxxxxxx. Between 1892 and 1920 I observe 4 probated deaths. The sum of the wealth
of the Axxxxxxx’s in this period is £12.4 Million (in £2015). Post 1920, I expect this amount of
capital to generate a ﬂow of wealth that should show up in the probate records of the Axxxxxxxs.
This ﬂow is calculated based on the rate-of-return of capital in the economy, net of inheritance and
capital income tax and also war-time destruction. All of these elements are separately calculated.
As ﬁgure 1.2 illustrates, the declared wealth of the Axxxxxxx dynasty is far below what we would
expect from that observed before 1920. The diﬀerence between the expected ﬂow of inherited wealth
and that actually declared is hidden wealth. In the period 1980-1992, this amounts to over £3m.
The Axxxxxxxs could be hiding about 94% of their inherited wealth. Despite the fact that there
1For speciﬁc details on this wealth measure, which are valuations of a deceased’s estate, see Cummins (2019);
Rubinstein (1974, 1981); Harbury (1962); Harbury and Hitchens (1979).
2Figures A.4c and A.4d report the declared wealth of 2 ‘hiding’ dynasties over the sample period, 1892-1992.
Figure A.4e on the other hand reports the declared wealth of a dynasty creating new wealth. One of these dynasties
is that of a former primeminister.
3The Axxxxxxxs are an English aristocratic family that traces its ancestors to the 10th century. A google search
reveals connections to the Royal family and many MPs of that name.
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Figure 1.1: Four Elements in The ‘Great Equalization’ of English Wealth
Source: a,b: Cummins (2019). c: Piketty Figure 6.3 (Data on the rate of return to capital available from http://piketty.pse.
ens.fr/en/capital21c2), and GDP per capita from the Maddison Project (http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/
home.htm). Both rates are ’Real’ (see Piketty p.209-11 on this point). d: Maximum inheritance tax plotted (HM Revenue &
Customs (2005)).
The current narrative: The wealth share of the top 1%, reported in ﬁgure 1.1a, declined because the rate of growth of the
economy was greater than the real rate-of-return on capital (1.1c), net of war-time destruction and taxes (estate taxes are
illustrated for example, 1.1d). In other words, new wealth created by economic growth (‘popular wealth’ reported in 1.1b)
grew faster than net returns on capital (Piketty (2014), p.362-3).
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Figure 1.2: The Wealth at Death of Members of the Axxxxxxx Dynasty
Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.
are only 96 Axxxxxxxs in England in 2002, the name appears as an account holder in the Offshore
Leaks database (International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (2019)).
This paper ﬁnds thousands of dynasties that appear to be hiding wealth such as the Axxxxxxxs.
Speciﬁcally I can name 3,311 dynasties hiding £3 Billion (£2015). I show that this hidden wealth
estimate predicts a dynasty’s appearance in the Offshore Leaks Database. I further show that hidden
wealth is correlated with postcode house-value in 1999, and attendance at Oxford and Cambridge
Universities, 1990-2016. These hidden wealth eﬀects are apparent even when controlling for observed
wealth.
A crucial clariﬁcation is due at this point: For any one dynasty, the categorization of the
missing wealth as hidden is a probability. The random hazards of marriage choices, mad inheritors,
disastrous investments, betrayal, theft, stupidity and bad luck can dilute even the grandest fortunes.
But I show that for Victorian elites as a whole, the richest 1,500 dynasties of the 1892-1920 period
(of which the Axxxxxxx are members), wealth is systematically hidden.
For the analysis, I select only rare surnames of English origin, who have less than 100 people
observed in the 1881 census, and track these rare surname dynasties in the Probate Calendars from
1892-1992. Formally, I compare estimated wealth calculated using the net-of-taxes rate-of-return
on capital on observed dynastic capital during the low-tax prewar years with that later actually
observed in the high-tax post war era. I incorporate wartime destruction and all death-taxes paid
into this estimate of ‘true’ inherited-wealth. Figure 1.3 illustrates the concept for calculating hidden
inherited wealth.
At the aggregate, this estimate is lower than observed wealth as new wealth is being created
by non-inheriting surname dynasties. Figure A.1 reported in the appendix, illustrates how newly
created wealth is captured. However, for the richest English dynasties, the Victorian Elite of 1892-
1920, it is clear that at least 20-32% of all elite wealth is hidden by their descendants, 1950-1992.
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Note: To estimate hidden inherited wealth, I project observed dynastic capital during the low-tax era forward using the net-
of-taxes rate-of-return on capital. I subtract wartime destruction and inheritance tax paid. Hidden wealth is the diﬀerence
between this expected wealth and that actually observed. I assume that wealth observed during the low-tax era is a much
better approximation of true dynastic wealth than wealth observed during the high-tax era.
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At the individual surname level, this hidden wealth estimate, and the proportion of wealth hid-
den, strongly predict the appearance of a surname in the recent Offshore Leaks Database (Interna-
tional Consortium of Investigative Journalists 2019). This suggest that a proportion of inheritance
taxation is potentially being evaded. Further, the richer the dynasty, the greater is the proportion
of wealth hidden.
Using the locations of 31 Million UK voters from the electoral roll of 1999, and the complete
price paid data for house sales 2017-8, I show that hidden wealth is associated with more expensive
postcodes. Hidden wealth boosts contemporary consumption and living standards of hiding dynas-
ties. Further, I show that their children are more likely to attend the elite universities of Oxford
and Cambridge, 1990-2016.
Incorporating this elite hidden wealth into a recalculation of the top decile wealth share shows
that the decline of the ‘true’ wealth share is signiﬁcantly more muted than that for observed wealth.
The richest decile hold an extra 10% of the ‘true’ wealth distribution, equivalent to a 33% reversal
of the observed decline.
This paper relates to existing work on the English wealth distribution Piketty (2014), Lin-
dert (1986), Harbury (1962); Harbury and McMahon (1973); Harbury and Hitchens (1976, 1977);
Atkinson and Harrison (1978); Harbury and Hitchens (1979); Lindert (1986); Atkinson et al. (1989);
Atkinson (2013); Alvaredo et al. (2018) and of course the titanic contributions of Piketty (summa-
rized in Piketty (2014)).
Of more immediate relevance to hidden wealth is the recent work of Gabriel Zucman: Zucman
(2013), analyzing systematic anomalies in the foreign assets and liabilities of countries, estimates
that 8% of household wealth is held unrecorded in oﬀshore tax havens. Alstadsæter et al. (2019),
also using oﬀ-shore banking leaks and micro-data, from Norway, Denmark and Sweden, claim that
“the 0.01% richest households evade about 25% of their taxes”.
This paper presents a simple method, combining historical and contemporary data, to estimate
hidden wealth at the surname level. This method produces a set of surnames that are potentially
hiding a large amount of wealth. Tax authorities could use this information to investigate potential
evasion.
Internationally, the pattern of a low-tax pre-war era followed by a high-tax post-war period is
almost universal; applying the method presented in this paper to other historical wealth data from
other countries could lead to the uncovering of vast sums of hidden wealth.
The implications of incorporating hidden wealth into the top wealth shares are of profound
importance. Changes in wealth inequality were the largest equalizing force in the 20th century
(Piketty, 2014). This paper shows that the true top-wealth share did indeed decline but not
by as much as that observed in the reported data. This ﬁnding is important for our empirical
understanding of the true evolution of inequality over the last century and is crucial for attempts
to understand the causal forces behind the ‘Great Equalization’. It also highlights the need for
further research on hidden wealth, both contemporary and historically, in the UK and elsewhere.
The data for analysis are presented in section 2, the methodology in section 3, results in section
4 (surname-group level) and section 5 (individual surname level). Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
This paper exploits several newly constructed and existing datasets.
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Figure 2.1: Comparing Diﬀerent Estimates of Top Wealth Shares, England 1892-1992
Notes: See Cummins (2019) for a detailed account of the source, construction and validation of the PPR data.
2.1 The Principal Probate Registry Calendar entries, 1892-1992
All estates of the deceased in England and Wales, above a threshold, require an act of probate for
inheritors to legally execute a will. I use the complete individual level wealth-at-death records from
the the Principal Probate Registry (PPR) Calendar entries, 1892-1992, to track English dynastic
wealth. This source records all decedents in England and Wales with wealth above the threshold
(currently £5,000). Name, address, date of death, the name of the executor and an estimate of estate
value were consistently recorded. The original printed volumes were digitized and algorithmically
parsed and formed into a database suitable for economic analysis, in a process described in Cummins
(2019) (and summarized in ﬁgure A.2 in the appendix).
Cummins (2019) investigates in depth the quality of the resulting data, 15 million individual
level wealth-at-death observations. The wealth-share estimates of the top percentiles match closely
estimates from Atkinson and Harrison (1978); Atkinson et al. (1989); Atkinson (2013) and Alvaredo
et al. (2018), who use aggregated returns reported by the Inland Revenue. Figure 2.1 compares the
PPR percentile shares of the English wealth at death distribution with those from Alvaredo et al.
(2018).4
2.2 Taxes Due at Death
Death duties are complicated taxes made up of diﬀerent time-varying components. All death du-
ties, composed of legacy, succession, estate duties (1892-1974), capital transfer tax (1974-1986),
and inheritance tax (1986 and after) were collected: HM Revenue & Customs (2005) reports
4I use the estimates reported in Table D1 of the working paper version, Alvaredo et al. (2017). See the appendix
for a comparison of average wealth per adult.
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Figure 2.2: Death Duties, 1892-2015
Notes: £2015. Inspired by similar ﬁgure in Nicholas (1999). Source: HM Revenue & Customs (2005) and Institute for
Fiscal Studies (2007).
the schedules 1894 to 1974. 5 Capital transfer tax replaced estate duty in 1975 and was it-
self replaced by inheritance tax in 1986. Inheritance tax is a ﬂat 40% above the nil-rate thresh-
old (reported by HM Revenue and Customs). The Institute for Fiscal Studies ((2007)) collected
the historical series for both inheritance tax and capital transfer tax (1986 to today; available at
https://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/ﬀ/iht.xls).
Figure 2.2 reports the total rate of death duties due by a set of estate values (in £2015), 1892-
2015. By combining the tax and probate data it is simple to calculate tax paid. Table 2.1 reports
the largest tax payers in England, 1892-1992.6
2.3 The Return on Capital and Capital Income Tax
The rate of return on capital (r) is taken from Piketty (Piketty (2014), website. I calculate the
net-of-taxes r, r∗, as r∗ = r − t, where t is the highest rate of tax on capital income estimated by
5Available at https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/.
6Note that the Grosvenor family famously invested the majority of their family fortune in a trust thus avoiding
inheritance tax (See for example this story from The Times: link). The richest English women in the data, Eleanor
Countess Peel, established a well endowed charitable trust with her estate (peeltrust.com). This will count as ‘hidden’
wealth in this analysis.
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Real Death Tax
Year Name County Wealth Duties, % Paid
1 1933 Sir John Reeves Baronet Ellerman London 1,257,371,575 52 653,833,219
2 1974 Charles Cross Hampshire 288,513,883 75 216,385,412
3 1935 TRH James Woolavington Cornwall 345,796,993 52 179,814,437
4 1957 James Armand De Rothschild Buckinghamshire 183,395,206 80 146,716,165
5 1958 William Stone London 147,904,760 80 118,323,808
6 1940 TRH Marmaduke Furness Leicestershire 139,121,970 67 93,211,720
7 1940 Jack Bamato Joel London 138,382,028 67 92,715,959
8 1929 Bernhard Baron East Sussex 213,606,754 42 89,714,837
9 1974 James Henry Bryan West Midlands 119,247,477 75 89,435,608
10 1935 Arthur Stanley-Wills North Yorkshire 169,260,470 52 88,015,445
11 1946 William Johnston Yapp Kent 128,326,006 67 85,978,424
12 1953 Hugh Richard Grosvenor* Cambridgeshire 105,630,735 80 84,504,588
13 1921 TRH Sir Ernest Joseph Cassel London 199,628,495 42 83,843,968
14 1949 TRH Eleanor Countess Peel Scottish Borders 102,871,973 80 82,297,579
15 1948 TRH Gerald Berkeley Lincolnshire 105,111,626 77 80,935,952
Notes: 2015 prices. “TRH” = “The Right Honourable”. * 2nd Duke of Westminster. Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.
Table 2.1: The 15 Largest Taxpayers, 1892-1992
Atkinson for the UK, 1908-1992, and also reported by Piketty (2014)7. Before 1908 I use a value of
2.9%. Piketty’s estimates of r, g (the growth rate of the economy and my calculation of r∗(using
his numbers)) are plotted in ﬁgure 2.3.
2.4 Offshore Leaks
The Offshore Leaks Database by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ)
(International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (2019)) contains detailed account level in-
formation on 785,000 oﬀshore companies, foundations and trusts from four recent data leaks; The
Paradise Papers (2017 and 2018, principally from the law ﬁrm Appleby), the Panama Papers (2016,
the law ﬁrm Mossack Fonseca), the Bahamas Leaks (2016, oﬃcial corporate registry) and the Oﬀ-
shore Leaks (2013, Portcullis Trustnet and Commonwealth Trust Limited). Once cleaned and
ﬁltered, there are 298,015 names of individuals behind these Oﬀshore entities and I utilize these
names in my analysis.8
It is of course not illegal to be a director or owner of a foreign entity. However, the presence,
or not, of elite inheritors in these lists is useful for our understanding of the destination of some of
this hidden wealth.
7The original sources are Sabine (1966) and the Annual Reports of the Commissioners of the Inland Revenue.
8I combined the “Oﬃcer” ﬁeld in all 4 databases and manually cleaned out companies and organizations.
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Source: Piketty (2014) http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/ﬁles/capital21c/en/xls/, spreadsheet Chapter14TablesFigures.xlsx. sheet
“DetailsTS14.1UK”, Detailed series on UK top income tax rates (data provided by A.B. Atkinson, September 2011)
2.5 Contemporary Outcomes: House Prices and Oxbridge Attendance
For contemporary outcomes by surname I collected individual nominal data on locations, house
prices, and Oxford and Cambridge University attendance.
All voters in the UK are listed in the electoral roll. I extracted the records of the 1999 UK
electoral roll from a CD-ROM entitled UK-Info Disk (2000). 1999 was the last year that the
complete, pre opt-out, electoral roll was available. This resulted in 31,551,398 observations of
forename, surname, speciﬁc address, and postcode.9
I then link the individual addresses from the electoral roll of 1999 to house price data by postcode
in 2017 (from the land registry)10. There are 1,758,312 postcodes in the UK so this is a highly
speciﬁc estimate of house values.
Attendance at Oxford and Cambridge Universities is sourced from oﬃcial publications and email
directories (see Clark and Cummins (2014); Clark et al. (2014); Clark and Cummins (2015, 2018)).
In addition to the these data, this paper also uses the complete count of the 1881 Census of
England and Wales, the Complete Death Register, 1892-2007 and multiple other ‘Big’ datasets
summarized in Cummins (2018, 2019).
9Extracting the data from the 20 year-old CD-Rom interface was a technical challenge as only 250 records per
individual search could be returned with a upper limit of 2,000 for any search criteria. Automation via jitbit
Macro Recorder (https://www.jitbit.com/macro-recorder/) over several months resulted in apx. 31m duplicate
free records. This represents a sample of apx. 70% (where 100% is 44m). The sample is complete for rarer names
but incomplete for common names due to the 2,000 results per query hard limit.
10‘Price paid’ data was downloaded from http://prod.publicdata.landregistry.gov.uk.
s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/pp-complete.txt(HM Land Registry, 2018).
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3 Methodology
The data allow me to observe all declared probated wealth 1892-1992. From the sum of this wealth
for surname ‘dynasties’, 1892-1914, I can estimate the ﬂow of ‘expected wealth’, 1920-2018. I am
then able to assess the relative contribution of wartime wealth destruction, the rate of return on
capital, the rate of growth of the economy, capital income tax and inheritance tax to the decline
of elite English wealth share (ﬁgure 1.1a). By comparing estimated with observed wealth, and
accounting for taxes; I can estimate how much of English wealth is ‘hidden’.
This section details my methodology for deﬁning surname ‘dynasties’, calculating wartime de-
struction, estimating expected wealth and measuring surname representation in the ICIJ Offshore
Leaks Database.
3.1 Tracking Surname ‘Dynasties’
I use rare surnames to track dynastic wealth over time. In England, surnames are hereditary
and are typically passed down through the male line just as the non-recombining region of the
Y-chromosome. Thus surnames generally mark clusters of genetically related men (and can be
deduced from human genomes (Gymrek et al., 2013), ﬁnding current utility in modern forensics).
The probability of co-ancestry of two individual men sharing a surname is dependent on the
number of founders of a surname, the incidence of non-paternities and genetic drift. Rare surnames
are signiﬁcantly more likely to indicate co-ancestry (surname counts under 5,000 (King et al., 2006;
King and Jobling, 2009)). Here rare surnames, deﬁned as a count of less than 100 people in the
1881 census, are employed under the assumption that the holders of that name are highly likely
to not only share some co-ancestry but can be thought of as part of the same surname ‘dynasty’.
Under the assumption of positive assortative mating, I also include women.
The wealth-shares of the top-percentiles of the wealth distribution, 1892-1992, calculated at
the rare-surname level are reported in ﬁgure 3.1. At the individual level, the top 10% have about
99% of all English wealth in 1900 - At the rare surname level the top decile have about 80% of all
wealth. In 1992, the top 10% of individuals have over 60% of wealth whilst the top 10% of surname
dynasties have just under 50%.
Despite these level diﬀerences, the time trends in the individual and aggregate series are remark-
able similar (compare ﬁgure 3.1 with ﬁgures 1.1a and 2.1). This suggests that the rare-surname
level grouping captures the changing dynamics of the 20th century wealth distribution.
Harbury and McMahon (1973) note:
some observers contend that the decline in the share of the richest percentiles in
the wealth distribution may be quite misleading, and reﬂect merely a rearrangement of
wealth within families, rather than a redistribution of wealth from rich to poor families
(p.810)
Figure 3.1 indicates that the ‘Great Equalization’ of English wealth is reﬂected at the surname-
dynasty level and not only the individual level. Therefore rearrangement of wealth within families
cannot explain the decline in the wealth share of the top 10%. (If it were, this would show up as
no change in the rare surname level wealth-shares 1900 to 1992.) Table 3.1 reports the distribution
of English surnames, population in 1881 and population in 2002, by surname count ranges.11 Rare
11Ethnicity was assigned to every observed surname using ONOMAP name classiﬁcation software
(http://www.onomap.org/) provided to me by Paul Longley and Oliver O’Brien (Both Department of Geography,
University College London).
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Figure 3.1: Observed Wealth Shares, Rare Surname Level, 1892-1992
Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.
surnames are both more likely to go extinct, or increase far more rapidly than common surnames.
There are 36,719 surnames that are held by less than 100 people in 1881. I deﬁne this group as the
universe of English rare names.12 It represents 1,049,250 individuals in 1881 and 2,133,793 in 2002.
Table 3.1: English Surname Extinction, 1881-2001
N Range, 1881 N, Surnames N, 1881 N, 2001 Prop. Extinct Ratio
1 1,791 1,791 38,330 0.15 21.40
2-5 3,442 10,151 80,365 0.14 7.92
5-10 5,212 36,103 142,200 0.10 3.94
10-20 7,402 104,419 269,520 0.07 2.58
20-50 11,306 363,995 675,159 0.05 1.85
50-100 7,566 532,791 928,219 0.02 1.74
500-2,000 3,734 3,557,709 6,278,178 0.00 1.76
>2,000 1,680 13,607,051 24,335,967 0.00 1.79
Note: Calculated from the 1881 census (Schurer and Woollard (2000) and National Statistics
(2002)
I deﬁne a ‘Victorian rare elite’ as the top 1,500 richest wealth-holding surnames from 1892 to
1920, for those surnames held by 2-100 people in the 1881 census (I drop surname counts of 1).13
12Of these 37,719 names, 18,979 appear at one time in the PPR calendar between 1892 and 1920. I track these
18,979 names in the analysis.
13Queen Victoria died on 22 January 1901, so consider the name a nominal convenience and not a iron-clad
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Table 3.2: English Surname Extinction, 1881-2001, Victorian Elite Dynasties
N Range, 1881 N, Surnames N, 1881 N, 2001 Prop. Extinct Ratio
2-5 26 93 539 0.08 5.80
5-10 68 458 2,054 0.12 4.48
10-20 173 2,525 5,866 0.07 2.32
20-50 543 18,581 32,774 0.03 1.76
50-100 690 50,213 85,232 0.00 1.70
Note: Calculated from the 1881 census (Schurer and Woollard (2000) and
National Statistics (2002)
Individuals holding these surnames die on average 420% richer than the average person, 1892 to
1992. By following these rare surnames in the PPR data, I can observe dynastic wealth. Table 3.2
also details the distribution of English surnames, population in 1881 and population in 2002, by
surname count ranges. for this Victorian rare elite.14
In addition a ‘middling’ Victorian wealth grouping, ranked 8,740-10,239 out of a rare lineage
universe of 18,979 and a Victorian ‘bottom’ grouping, the bottom ranked 5,000 wealth holders, out
of the same 18,979 surnames.
3.2 Wartime Destruction
To estimate the destruction of capital due to the World Wars I look at the sum of rare dynastic
wealth in the 5 years before and after the wars. Wartime destruction, wd of wealth, W , for surname
j is calculated as
Wwd =
WarStart∑
t=WarStart−5
wjt−
WarEnd+5∑
t=WarEnd
wjt
WarStart∑
t=WarStart−5
wjt
(1)
where WarStart is the start year of the war (either 1918 or 1939) and WarEnd is the end of
the war (1918 or 1945). This will be an imperfect measure of the true wealth destruction of the
war: Younger deaths during war will give the appearance of larger wealth destruction because of
lost life-course wealth accumulation. Acting against this will be the reduced possibility to move
wealth around to avoid the taxation of bequests. For simplicity, I take the simple ratio of equation
1.
deﬁnition. (As an aside; the monarch is not subject to probate (Nash (2017) p.128)).
14The two tables we can immediately rule out diﬀerential fertility as a potential channel behind the dilution of
elite wealth. By comparing the growth rate of rare names in the population, 1881-2002 to names in the Victorian
top-one-percent, it can be seen that if anything elite fertility acted against wealth dilution. At every range, the
growth rate of the ‘Victorian Elite’ is lower (or only marginally higher in the 5-10 count range) than that of the
general population. Surname extinction rates of the Victorian elite are also lower (again apart from the 5-10 count
range).
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3.3 Estimating ‘Expected’ Wealth, 1920-2018
Using the PPR calendar probate micro-data, I estimate expected wealth, W ∗ at year t of of rare
surname j
W ∗j,t =
1920∑
Wj
1892
28
(1 + rnet1920)(1 + r
net
1921) . . . (1 + r
net
t−1) (2)
where W is observed real wealth (2015 pounds) in any year, 1892-1920, growing at the net-of-
taxes rate of return on capital, rnet, where taxes are the maximum tax rate on capital income (TK),
estimated as
rnet = r − TK (3)
Observed Wartime destruction of wealth, by wealth grouping, is applied to W ∗ in 1945 to
account for World War II (See table 4.2). I divide the initial capital estimate by 28 to estimate the
subsequent, expected annual ﬂow of wealth (1920− 1892 = 28).
The major weakness of my approach is that it cannot measure new wealth creation by elite
inheritors (although new wealth creation by non-inheritors is observed, see equation 8 below). This
is of course an unrealistic assumption. However, the purpose of the exercise is to estimate a lower
bound for the amount of wealth hidden by the English elite. Any new elite-inheritor wealth creation
will make W ∗ an underestimate of their ‘true’ dynastic wealth.15
To estimate a lower bound on the amount of wealth hidden by the elite lineages, I apply the
following logic: If death taxes, denoted as TD, are close to zero, then there is no ﬁnancial incentive
for the rich to make arrangements to avoid paying taxes upon death. When TD > 0, we can expect
rational agents with bequest motives to avoid (legal) and perhaps evade (illegal) paying death taxes.
This can be done by inter-vivos bequests and transferring assets between classes (for example trusts
and oﬀshore companies). Suppose family j has total wealth W
Wj = α(Wj) + (1− α)Wj 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 (4)
where α is the propensity to avoid/evade, and is an increasing function of the tax rate and other
factors that make it easier or harder to hide wealth (Z)16:
α = f(TK , TD,W,Z) (5)
15Acting against this will be the possible consumption of inherited wealth. If wealth is systematically spent on
consumption and not invested, then my estimate of ‘hidden’ wealth is not truly concealed wealth but simply a measure
of lost wealth due to consumption. At the dynastic level, I assume that the propensity to consume wealth and the
propensity to add to dynastic wealth through income, result in a zero net gain or loss to the sum of inherited wealth.
Supporting this assumption is the remarkable stability in the ranking of English dynasties, at the rare surname level,
documented by Clark and Cummins (2015). That study, using a subsample of the PPR calendar data used in this
paper, estimate the intergenerational correlation of dynastic wealth at .7-.75. Over the sample period, Elite English
dynasties regress towards the mean, but at a glacial pace. Further, there was no evidence for the very rich to regress
to the mean faster than the not-so-rich, the average or the poor (Clark and Cummins (2015), a ﬁnding that tends to
get overlooked in the literature).
16These may include legal changes, technology, culture and so on. See Alstadsæter et al. (2019) for recent evidence
on the positive relationship between wealth and the propensity to evade tax.
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When taxes are 0, the observed estate at death is the true underlying wealth, Wj . This is the
case in England before WWI. After WWI, observed wealth at death is the second component of
equation 4. According to ﬁgure 1.1d, death taxes (TD) are substantially lower before WWI than
after. For the super-wealthy, the maximum death duty is ≈ 10%, 1894-1910. From 1945-1958, the
maximum ≈ 70 − 80%. Pre-War the PPR records reveal ‘true’ family wealth, Wj .
17 After they
reveal (1− α)Wj = W
obs
j .
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Cumulative tax paid (T p) is calculated as
T p =
t∑
1920
TDt ∗W
obs
j,t (6)
where as before death taxes are TD and W obs (= (1− α)W ) is observed wealth from the PPR
calendars.
Where estimated wealth is greater than reported wealth inclusive of cumulative death-taxes
paid, I calculate the diﬀerence as hidden wealth (HW ). I divide cumulative taxes paid by 30 so
that death taxes are eﬀectively charged once per generation. Again this is to estimate the expected
annual ﬂow as equation 4.
HWj,t = W
∗
j,t −
[
W obsj,t +
T p
30
]
: W ∗j,t > W
obs
j,t +
T p
30
(7)
Note that by construction, HW must be greater than zero. Observed wealth that is in excess
of that predicted by the level of inherited wealth, I calculate:
HWj,t =
[
W obsj,t +
T p
30
]
−W ∗j,t : W
∗
j,t < W
obs
j,t +
T p
30
(8)
which by construction gives negative HW , which is newly created wealth.
Next I estimate the ‘true’ wealth, W , of English dynasties, 1920-2018. This is done in 2 parts,
for wealth inheritors and for those creating new wealth. Inheritors W is calculated as:
Wj,t = W
∗
j,t −
[
T p
30
]
(9)
And for new wealth creation dynasties, wealth in excess of that predicted by inheritance, W is
calculated by
Wj,t = (
1
1− α
)W obsj,t (10)
Newly created wealth is incorporated by adjusting upwards observed wealth (W obs) by the
implied population degree of tax avoidance, α.19 This is initially given a value of α = .0 for
17In the analysis I use 1920 as the cut-oﬀ for observing ‘true’ wealth. This is due to the structural break in the
trend of the top 1% in apx. 1920 as revealed in ﬁgure 1.1a.
18One could argue that privacy concerns might motivate some to conceal their true wealth. But that will still
make wealth observed when tax = 0 a much more accurate estimate of family wealth than when tax is signiﬁcantly
greater than 0.
19For a proportion of the surname-generation level estimates (8,469/56,937), the estimate of newly created wealth
is greater than that observed (HW > W obs). This happens for dynasties where new wealth is being created that is
in excess of that predicted by observed dynastic capital pre-1920. The case can be illustrated with a speciﬁc lineage
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Name V ariable Source Eq.
Directly Observed
‘True’ Lineage Wealth W Probate Valuations 1892-1920
Death Taxes TD IR Tables, Figure 2.2
Reported Wealth W obs = (1− α)W Probate Valuations 1920-92
Taken from Other Studies
Return on K r Piketty (2014)
Tax on K income TK Piketty (2014)
Calculated
Taxes Paid T p TD(1− α)W 6
Net return on K rnet r − TK 3
Expected Wealth W ∗ (1− α)W (1 + rnet) 2
Hidden Wealth HW [W ∗ − (W obs + T p)] > 0 7
New Wealth −HW (W obs + T p)−W ∗ < 0 8
‘True’ Wealth, Inheritors W W ∗ − T p 9
‘True’ Wealth, Non-Inheritors W 1
1−α
W obs 10
Proportion Hidden α HW/W 11
Notes: Estimated for rare surname j and time t. Summary terms for illustration, see text for
detailed equations.
Table 3.3: Summary Table of Sources, Identities and equations for Estimating Lineage Wealth
simplicity but is varied in section 5.4 when calculating wealth shares (see tables 4.4 and 5.2 for the
empirical estimates).
Finally I calculate the proportion of wealth hidden, α, as
αj,t =
HWj,t
Wj,t
(11)
By construction, α ranges from −1 (all wealth observed is newly created wealth) to +1 (all
wealth is hidden).
Table 3.3 summarizes the sources for estimating the elements of equations 1 to 11.
(anonymized). The XXXXXX dynasty (97 people counted in the 1881 census, 129 in 2002) report £1, 052, 781 in
wealth 1950-1980. Their estimated wealth, assuming no deaths taxes, for 1950-80 is £595, 229, and when this is
compared with that observed plus taxes-paid factored back in (W obs + £826, 353 = £1, 879, 134), their implied
newly created wealth (−HW ) is £1, 283, 904. (All in 2015 pounds.) The problem is that the method returns a value
for newly created wealth that is greater than that observed. Their inheritance, accounting for tax paid is negative
(W ∗−TP/30 = −£231, 124). Common sense would indicate that best estimate of their true wealth is their observed
wealth. Therefore, for these cases, I assign all wealth observed as new wealth (HW = −W obs) and the proportion
of hidden wealth is assigned as −1 (all wealth is new).
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4 Results
4.1 Wartime Destruction of Dynastic Wealth
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 report the wartime destruction of English wealth, calculated as in equation 1
for all, and the dynasty groupings. Wartime wealth destruction is far greater in World War I than
World War II, 35% versus 17% respectively.
However, the lineage analysis reveals that this destruction is entirely limited to the pre-war
elites. Nearly 60% of Victorian Elite dynastic wealth is wiped out during the Great War. The
middling and bottom lineages get richer after the war.
World War II also sees more destruction of Victorian elite wealth but this time it is about half
as damaging at 29%. Further, the Second World War was more egalitarian in its wealth destruction
and thus less of an equalizing force than the Great War, at least as far as this dynastic evidence
suggests.
Table 4.1: Wartime Destruction of Wealth, World War I
Victorian
Wealth
Pre-War
Wealth
Post-War
Wealth
Prop.
Destroyed
N N,
Lineages
All 64,250 41,994 0.346 396,343 34,259
Elites 2,145 919 0.572 2,761 990
Middling 35 62 -0.755 1,029 570
Bottom 13 117 -7.832 1,863 1,261
Note: Wealth is in Millions, £2015. Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.
Table 4.2: Wartime Destruction of Wealth, World War II
Victorian
Wealth
Pre-War
Wealth
Post-War
Wealth
Prop.
Destroyed
N N,
Lineages
All 91,390 76,026 0.168 623,413 53,181
Elites 1,507 1,112 0.262 4,553 1,153
Middling 219 187 0.149 2,647 996
Bottom 327 316 0.033 5,308 2,514
Note: Wealth is in Millions, £2015. Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.
4.2 The Relative Contribution of Wartime Destruction and Taxes to
Wealth Accumulation: A Simple Simulation
What is the expected cumulative eﬀect on elite inherited wealth of the calculated wartime destruc-
tion, return on capital and tax regime after 1920?
Figure 4.1 reports the growth rate of £1 billion (2015 pounds) in 1920, to 1992, under a set of
varying assumptions. (Note that the y-axis scale is log(10)). The ﬁrst estimated path is that the
fortune grows at the average rate of the return to capital in the economy. This results in a sum
of £222 billion in 1992. Applying the observed wealth destruction of elite fortunes from tables 4.1
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Figure 4.1: The eﬀect of Wartime Destruction, r, and r net of income and inheritance taxes on
Capital Accumulation
Source: Simulation.
and 4.2 during the wars reduces the terminal wealth in 1992 to £60 billion (a proportionate drop of
73%, compared to no War). Income taxes on capital during the 20th century reduced this ‘No-War’
potential wealth by 98%. Finally, Inheritance taxes (paid once per generation, the maximum rate
is applied) reduced wealth proportionally by 80%. Together these forces left a 1920’s fortune of 1
billion pounds worth .17 billion in 1992.
This suggests that capital income tax had the most potential eﬀect on diluting elite wealth with
a marginal proportionate eﬀect of 99%. War (73% marginal eﬀect) and inheritance tax (79%) were
eclipsed by the annual compounding of capital income tax.
Of course this simple exercise assumes no avoidance or evasion by elite wealth holders. At
minimum, it serves to illustrate that a strong incentive existed to hide wealth from taxation in
England post 1920.
Table 4.3: The eﬀect of War and Taxes on a fortune of £1 Billion in 1920 accumulating to 1992
Growth Path Wealth,
£bn.
1992
Lost
Wealth
Prop.
Loss
Marginal
Prop.
Loss
No War, r 222.73 0.00 0.000 0.00
War, r 59.17 163.56 0.734 0.73
War, r net of income tax 0.87 58.30 0.262 0.99
War, r net of inheritance an income tax 0.18 0.69 0.003 0.79
Note: Wealth is in Millions, £1920. Source: Simulation.
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What do we observe about actual family fortunes, as revealed by rare surname dynasties, in
England, 1892 to 1992?
4.3 Estimated and Observed Lineage Wealth Accumulation
The observed wealth shocks (tables 4.1 and 4.2) are applied to the estimated growth path of
dynastic wealth, as described in equation 2. Figure 4.2 reports three series: estimated lineage wealth
(equation 2), observed wealth ((1− α)W ) and observed wealth plus taxes paid (T p), accumulating
at rnet, for all wealth holders, 1892-1992. At this aggregate, the positive diﬀerence between the
estimated and observed series is new wealth creation (see also ﬁgure A.3 in the appendix which
compares estimated wealth with observed for the middling and bottom wealth holding groups).
However, when the exercise is executed for the ‘Victorian rare elite’ lineages, as in ﬁgure 4.2b, the
pattern is diﬀerent. The ﬁrst observation to note is the close correspondence of estimated and
observed wealth from 1920 to 1940.20
After 1950, reported wealth at death is consistently and systematically below the level of wealth
we would expect. This is hidden wealth. Its emergence is coincident with a large uptick in the
levels of inheritance tax applied to estates of £5-10 Million (2015 prices) (see ﬁgure 2.2).
How much wealth is being hidden by these Victorian elites?
4.4 What is the Propensity to Hide Wealth?
Table 4.4 reports the sum of hidden wealth by decade (as equation 7) and the mean value of α
(the proportion of ‘true wealth’ hidden) for the Victorian rare elite lineages, 1920-1990. The results
indicate that a lower bound of 20-32% of wealth is hidden for this elite grouping, post 1950. The
proportion hidden, α, falls after the 1970s, coincident with the reduction of the extremely high
death duties of the earlier post-War era.
Table 4.4: Hidden Wealth and the Propensity to Hide, the Victorian Rare Elite, England 1920-1990
Decade ‘True’
Wealth
Observed
Wealth
Observed
+ Paid in
Inheritance
Tax
Hidden
Wealth
Prop.
Hidden
1920 2,300 2,099 2,169 131 0.057
1930 3,095 2,802 3,071 24 0.008
1940 2,517 2,380 2,879 -363 -0.144
1950 2,612 1,243 1,926 686 0.263
1960 2,817 1,378 2,238 579 0.206
1970 2,968 964 2,015 953 0.321
1980-92 4,497 1,798 3,557 939 0.209
Note: Wealth is in Millions, £2015. Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.
20Note also that reported wealth plus taxes paid is higher than expected wealth in the 1940s. This may reﬂect a
desire for the very rich to contribute to the ﬁnancing of the war or a lag in adjusting their behavior to the new high-
tax regime. After 1950, this disappears. Note also the rise in reported wealth plus tax after 1980. This corresponds
with the aggregate rise and the lowering of the extreme death tax levels to 40%. Figure A.3 in the appendix reports
the same estimates for the Victorian mid and bottom Lineages.
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5 Surname Level Analysis
As opposed to looking at lineage groups of 1,500 names, in this section I use all 18,921 rare surnames.
I report the pattern of hidden wealth by decile and the predictive power of hidden wealth and
the proportion of wealth hidden for appearance of a speciﬁc surname in the ICIJ Offshore Leaks
Database. The impact of hidden wealth on contemporary outcomes; housing and and elite education
is estimated. Finally I recalculate the top 10% wealth-share, incorporating hidden wealth.
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics, Rare Surname Level
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Median Max
Generation 56,763 2 .82 1 2 3
N, Probated 56,763 7.73 8.24 0 5 149
N, 2002 56,763 78.92 72.84 0 58 597
Inferred Wealth 56,763 .74 2.24 0 .17 120.62
Observed Wealth 56,763 .87 5.95 0 .35 1,269.79
Tax Paid 56,763 .25 4.92 0 .02 884.06
Hidden Wealth 56,763 −.28 6.09 −1,269.79 −.09 101.75
Hidden Wealth (>0) 56,763 .30 1.54 0 0 101.75
Proportion Hidden 56,763 −.28 .66 −1 −.5 1
Proportion Hidden (>0) 56,763 .18 .31 0 0 1
Hide Any Wealth 56,763 .30 .46 0 0 1
Victorian Elite 56,763 .08 .27 0 0 1
In Paradise Leaks 18,921 .12 .32 0 0 1
N, Paradise 18,921 .68 2.67 0 0 35
House Value, 1999 18,126 334.45 305.41 7.26 289.25 14,750.00
Oxbridge Rate 18,921 .01 .02 0 0 0
Note: Wealth is in Millions, £2015. House prices are thousands, £.
Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.
I aggregate all individual observations to the surname level by generation. The ﬁrst generation
is 1920-1950, the second is 1950-80 and the ﬁnal generation is 1980-1992. Table 5.1 reports the
summary statistics for the rare surname-level analysis.21 The size of these dynasties varies from
0-149 people dying in generation with a median of 5. The median living population of people with
these rare surnames in 2002 is 58, with a 0-597 range. 30% of the sample report wealth below what
we would expect from their pre-1920 inheritance.22 12% of the names show up in the paradise
papers. A striking number in table 5.1 is the minimum reported hidden wealth, -1.27 Billion. This
is the newly created wealth of the Ellerman dynasty (See table 2.1).23
21Note that the paradise paper link is done for generation 3, 1980-92, only. In the 1999 electoral roll, not all rare
surnames are found: 18,126 out of 18,921 names are present, 795 are not.
22There are 3,311 dynasties hiding £3 Billion (£2015). This is the number of unique ‘hiding’ dynasties, where
hidden wealth > 0, across all 3 generations, and the sum of their maximum observed hidden wealth, as summarized
in table 5.1.
23A portion of this estate was transformed in to a charitable trust and now funds the Scottish Ballet and Bumblebees
(https://ellerman.org.uk/what-weve-funded/case-studies)
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I calculate deciles based upon the observed wealth at death of a surname and also the inferred
wealth, separately.
5.1 The Proportion of Wealth Hidden and Newly Created Wealth, by
Wealth Decile
How does the tendency to hide wealth vary across the wealth distribution? Figure 5.1 illustrates
the distribution of the proportion of newly created and hidden wealth, as calculated by equation 11,
by inferred wealth decile and generation. The density distribution is scaled so that the maximum
value is 1. This is for easy comparability across the percentile groups.
Figure 5.1 illustrates that the distribution of newly created wealth and hidden wealth is bi-
modal. In general, newly created wealth dominates (negative hidden wealth, as indicated by the
left-side of the distribution). For the poorest group, the bottom 70%, there is also a tendency for
there not to be any high proportion of either new or hidden wealth. This is because wealth itself is
so low for this group. (Mechanically if wealth is estimated as zero, hidden wealth is set at zero.)
The right-side of the distribution illustrated in ﬁgure 5.1 shows the relative proportion of hidden
wealth.
In the 1920-1950 period, the top 10% of the wealth distribution hide less wealth than everyone
else. This reﬂects the relatively greater destruction of elite wealth during both World Wars (tables
4.1 and 4.2). For the post-War generations, there is a clear tendency for the higher wealth deciles
to hide proportionally more wealth.
To get a minimum value for the proportion of wealth hidden, I calculate the proportion of hidden
wealth again, this time setting all newly created wealth at zero. This can give us a lower bound
on the tendency to hide inherited wealth. Table 5.2 reports these proportions. The top 10% hide
36% of their wealth, on average in 1950-80. This estimate corresponds closely to the estimate of
apx. 40% of wealth hidden by the top decile of Scandinavian wealth estimated by Alstadsæter et
al. (2019) (see their ﬁgure 3 bottom panel).24
From 1980-92 these relative percentages are 19 and 8 respectively with the 70-80th and 80-90th
percentiles falling in between, in both generations.
The general tendency for my estimates of hidden wealth to fall over time may simply reﬂect the
method: I calculate the share of inherited wealth from the 1892-1920 generation that is hidden.
The share of newly created wealth hidden, 1920-1992, is not observed nor inferred. For this reason I
consider the estimates from 1950-80 as the best guess estimate of the true hidden wealth share. The
generation is not exposed to the capital destruction of a World War, economic growth is booming
in Western Europe and death taxes are at their maximum. Inheritance from pre WWI is still a
signiﬁcant portion of all wealth. After 1980 new wealth creation means that my method loses power.
In any case, at all times, my estimates are lower bounds.
In sum there is a positive relationship between the proportion of wealth hidden, and wealth.
However the distribution of newly created wealth and hidden wealth is multi-modal. For the
empirical analysis, I code categorical variables to capture potential non-linear associations.
24Both estimates are lower bounds. My estimates cannot capture newly created wealth, of elite inheritors. The
estimates of Alstadsæter et al. (2019) are for wealth in HSBC accounts only.
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Figure 5.1: The Proportion of Newly Created Wealth and Hidden Wealth, by Wealth Percentile
Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.
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Table 5.2: Mean Proportion of Wealth Hidden, Surname Level
Inferred Generation
Wealth Percentile 1920-50 1950-80 1980-92 N
The Top 10% .24 .36 .20 5,552
The 80th-90th .35 .31 .16 5,618
The 70th-80th .29 .22 .12 5,640
The Bottom 70% .21 .15 .08 39,530
Note: Negative hidden wealth is set at zero. Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.
5.2 Is Hidden Wealth in Offshore Tax Havens?
At the group and surname level there is evidence that a signiﬁcant portion of wealth is hidden.
Where is it? Oﬀshore companies, foundations and trusts serve as potential destination for hidden
wealth. Here I compare surname-level estimates of hidden wealth (HW ), with the appearance of
those same surnames in the Offshore Leaks Database (International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists (2019)).
To measure presence in the ICIJ data, I code a simple 0/1 variable for a surnames presence
(DParadise). As reported in table 5.1 about 12% of the sample surnames show up in the Paradise
leaks (with a median equal to zero) and an average count of .7 (median also equal to zero). For the
analysis only data from generation 3, 1980-1992, is used.
The general forms of the empirical models I apply to the surname level data are:
Y j = c+ β1
∑
DjOW + β2X
j + β3ln(N
j
2002) (12)
Y j = c+ β1
∑
DjOW +
∑
β2iDXj + β3ln(N
j
2002) (13)
Xj =
{
DjHider, HW
j , αj
}
(14)
Y j =
{
DjParadise, H
j
pcvj, OXB
j
}
(15)
where DOW are categorical indicators for the wealth percentile observed from the PPR calendars
for surname j. This set of values are one of the bottom 70% and every decile to the top 10%. N2002
is the count of the surname in 2002 (ONS). X represents the set of hidden wealth calculations
generated by this paper. I separately model Dhider, a categorical variable equal to 1 where hidden
wealth is greater than zero and set to zero where no hidden wealth is estimated, α, as before, is
the proportion of ‘true’ wealth hidden. DX represents a set of categorical transformations of the
hidden wealth calculations, designed to capture non-linear eﬀects.25
Y j is the set of outcomes I observe at the surname level. In addition to DParadise, I estimate the
same functional form for the outcomes Hjppcv, the average postal-code value observed in the 1999
electoral roll and OXBj , the attendance rate of a surname at Oxford and Cambridge Universities,
1990-2016. I use logistic regression to model the categorical dependent variable, DParadise.
25In appendix table A.5 I present estimates using exact observed wealth as a control, entered as a cubic expression,
in place of the observed wealth percentile. The results are almost exactly the same.
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The estimates are executed at the surname level, for all rare surnames. Table 5.3 reports the
results for presence in the ICIJ Paradise leaks database.26 Logistic regression coeﬃcients (log-
odds) are exponentiated to odds ratios for ease of interpretation and the regression t-statistics are
reported in place of standard errors27. (The results and signifciance levels are not dependent on
the method used, an OLS version of table 5.3 is reported in the appendix as table A.1.)
Appearance of a surname in the Paradise papers leaks is related to the number of people with
that surname counted in England and Wales by the ONS in 2002. As well as an essential control
variable, this also serves as a sanity check on the empirical exercise. In every speciﬁcation, the top
wealth decile have an odds ratio of 1.35-1.42 relative to the odds of the bottom 70%. The simple
hider dummy also indicates a higher odds of appearing (1.2 times the odds of non-hiders) as does
the level of hidden wealth. The eﬀects of hidden wealth are non-linear as indicated by column 3.
There, using categorical wealth groups, we see the odds of appearing in the paradise papers are 1.4
times higher for those who have an estimated lineage hidden wealth of £1m and up. All of these
coeﬃcients are statistically signiﬁcant the 1% level with the top 10% dummy, the proportion of
hidden wealth (column 4), and the simple hider dummy all being signiﬁcant at the p = .001 level.
In every column, the set of hidden wealth measures is informative of the probability of a sur-
names’ appearance in the Paradise papers leaks. Hidden wealth matters even when controlling for
observed wealth. The correlation for those with a annual hidden wealth amounting to over £1m is
approximately equal to the eﬀect of being in the top 10% of the observed wealth distribution.28
By cross-referencing the hidden wealth estimates with the ICIJ Offshore Leaks Database there
is evidence that certain surname dynasties may be evading their taxes. Both hidden wealth and the
propensity to hide wealth are statistically signiﬁcant predictors of appearance in the Offshore Leaks
Database, all the while controlling for total ‘true’ wealth. Figure 5.2 reports the top 50 dynasties,
ordered by the amount of hidden wealth.29 I have anonomyzed the names. While the method
employed here can claim that the Victorian Elite are ‘hiding’ wealth, for any one lineage it is only
a probability. The hazards of bad investments, mad inheritors, bad marriage choices, preferences
for consumption over preservation of wealth and simple bad luck can easily destroy even the largest
family’s wealth. At the surname-dynastic level, ﬁgure 5.2 and table A.2 lists the hiders as well
as the unlucky. Without speciﬁc research into these families, we cannot say which category they
belong to, hence I do not report their names.
26All rare surnames appearing in the paradise papers were inspected by eye. Potentially misleading rare surnames
that could also be confused with banking terms and jurisdictions (such as Trust, Jersey and Pension) were removed,
as were names that were misclassiﬁed as English by Onomap. The regressions are run using the 15,975 surname
observations that record at least one death 1980-92.
27I choose to report t-statistics because the conﬁdence intervals around odds ratios are non-symmetric so therefore
the approximated standard error (for example the one reported in Stata) cannot be used to calculate them.
28Investigations of the empirical models of the form in equations 12 and 13 on the count of a rare surname as
dependent variable in the Paradise papers failed to generate any large or statistically signiﬁcant results. Considering
that hidden wealth predicts the probability of appearance, the count results imply that hidden wealth is negative
associated with the count of a name in the paradise papers, once we examine varaition above 0. This is conﬁrmed
by zero-inﬂated negative binomial models and censored OLS models (results available upon request).
29Table A.2, in the appendix, lists the top 50 dynasties, their hidden wealth, their propensity to hide, the number
of them living in the UK in 2002, whether presence is recorded in the Offshore Leaks Database and whether they
were members of the Victorian Elite.
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Table 5.3: Wealth, Hidden Wealth and the Proportion of Hidden Wealth as Predictors of Presence
in the Paradise Papers
Paradise Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Wealth Percentile: 70-80 1.020 .996 1.013 1.030 1.029
t =.245 t = −.049 t =.159 t =.366 t =.354
80-90 1.130 1.098 1.124 1.139 1.139
t = 1.558 t = 1.206 t = 1.494 t = 1.660 t = 1.659
The Top 10% 1.423 1.369 1.412 1.429 1.431
t = 4.598∗∗∗ t = 4.161∗∗∗ t = 4.490∗∗∗ t = 4.644∗∗∗ t = 4.659∗∗∗
DHider 1.212
t = 3.060∗∗
Hidden Wealth 1.047
t = 2.558∗
HW : 0-.2m 1.025
t =.238
HW : .2m-1m 1.251
t = 2.568∗
HW :>1m 1.411
t = 3.123∗∗
Prop. Hidden, α 1.385
t = 3.356∗∗∗
α: 0-.5 1.099
t = 1.041
α .5-.75 1.359
t = 2.918∗∗
α. 75-.9 1.191
t = 1.303
α>.90 1.330
t = 1.927
N2002 1.004 1.004 1.004 1.004 1.004
t = 13.004∗∗∗ t = 12.903∗∗∗ t = 13.034∗∗∗ t = 13.031∗∗∗ t = 13.026∗∗∗
Observations 15,975 15,975 15,975 15,975 15,975
Log Likelihood -5,705.695 -5,707.217 -5,703.138 -5,704.845 -5,704.194
Akaike Inf. Crit. 11,423.390 11,426.430 11,422.280 11,421.690 11,426.390
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Wealth is in 2015 Pounds, Per Annum ﬂow
No hidden wealth and α = 0 are the omitted categories
Hidden wealth is calculated 1980-92, estimated via logistic regression
Odds Ratios are reported with t-stats in parantheses
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Figure 5.2: The Top 50 Hiding Dynasties, Hidden and Declared Wealth
Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.
27
5.3 Hidden Wealth and Contemporary Outcomes: Housing Value and
Oxbridge Attendance
What is the impact of hidden wealth on contemporary outcomes? Tables 5.4 reports the correlations
of hidden wealth, as equations 12 and 13, with average postcode house-value of a surname, observed
in the 1999 electoral roll.
The top observed wealth percentiles live in more expensive postcodes than the bottom 70%. The
top 10% live in houses that, are on average, almost £100,000 more expensive than the bottom 70%.
However, even controlling for observed wealth, hidden wealth matters. Knowing that a surname
has any hidden wealth is associated with them living, on average, in a postcode with house prices
that are almost £40,000 more expensive (col. 1). Knowing that a dynasty has over £1m in hidden
wealth is associated with them, again on average, living in a postcode with nearly £90,000 more
expensive homes (col. 3). The eﬀect of hidden wealth is substantial and in most cases statistically
signiﬁcant at the one-tenth of one-percent level.
Table 5.5 reports the same empirical formulation as before (equations 12 and 13) for wealth and
attendance at the elite universities of Oxford and Cambridge, 1990-2016. Wealth has a strong eﬀect
on attending these institutions. In Z score units, where the mean is 0 and the standard deviation is
1, being a member of the top 10% of dynasties boosts Oxbridge attendance by .26 units (p < 0.001).
For Oxbridge, hidden wealth predicts attendance, even when controlling for observed wealth. The
eﬀect is large; hidden wealth over £1m boosts attendance by .17 standardized units. For the Hiding
dummy, the amount of hidden wealth, wealth over £1m and the proportion of hidden wealth, the
coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the one-tenth of one-percent level
5.4 ‘True’ Inherited Wealth and the Decline of Elite Wealth. Accounting
for the ‘Great Equalization’
Finally, what are the implications of hidden elite wealth for our understanding of the historical
evolution of the wealth distribution? As ﬁgure 1.1a reports, the standard interpretation is built
upon the massive decline in the observed relative wealth-share of the top decile, the top percentile
and the top .1% (Atkinson and Harrison (1978); Piketty (2014); Alvaredo et al. (2018)). This
narrative places Wartime destruction, taxes and economic growth as the causal forces behind the
‘Great Equalization.
Figure 5.3 reports a recalculated top decile wealth-share based on true wealth, incorporating
hidden wealth, and compares it with the observed series. This is calculated as before over rare
surnames, which, as discussed earlier, capture the secular decline in inequality over the 20th century.
For this calculation I assume that true, underling wealth is 1.3 times observed wealth. This is done
on the basis of the observed proportion of hidden inherited wealth reported in tables 4.4 and 5.2.
The decline of the top wealth share is still evident but it has diﬀerent characteristics. By 1980,
the richest decile of dynasties hold an extra 10% of the ‘true’ wealth distribution, equivalent to a
33% reversal of the observed decline. Further, from 1940 to 1970, there is no decrease in the ‘true’
top decile share.30
30This ﬁnding is similiar to Alstadsæter et al. (2019) who ﬁnd that “accounting for hidden assets erases almost
half of the decline in the top 0.1% wealth share observed”.
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Table 5.4: Wealth, Hidden Wealth and the Proportion of Hidden Wealth as Predictors of House
Price in 1999
House Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Wealth Percentile: 70-80 16.2∗ 13.1 15.0 17.3∗ 16.9∗
(7.6) (7.6) (7.6) (7.7) (7.7)
80-90 47.3∗∗∗ 43.6∗∗∗ 46.3∗∗∗ 48.1∗∗∗ 47.9∗∗∗
(7.8) (7.8) (7.8) (7.9) (7.9)
The Top 10% 95.3∗∗∗ 89.1∗∗∗ 93.4∗∗∗ 95.1∗∗∗ 95.5∗∗∗
(8.2) (8.2) (8.2) (8.2) (8.2)
DHider 38.4
∗∗∗
(6.0)
Hidden Wealth 13.7∗∗∗
(2.3)
HW : 0-.2m 11.0
(9.6)
HW : .2m-1m 34.4∗∗∗
(8.5)
HW :>1m 86.7∗∗∗
(11.6)
Prop. Hidden, α 57.6∗∗∗
(9.3)
α: 0-.5 27.9∗∗
(8.7)
α .5-.75 41.7∗∗∗
(10.6)
α. 75-.9 67.1∗∗∗
(13.0)
α>.90 27.1
(14.6)
N2002 −.6
∗∗∗ −.6∗∗∗ −.6∗∗∗ −.6∗∗∗ −.6∗∗∗
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
Observations 18,126 18,126 18,126 18,126 18,126
R2 .02 .02 .02 .02 .02
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Wealth is in 2015 Pounds, Per Annum ﬂow
House Prices are in Thousands of 2018 Pounds
No hidden wealth, α = 0 are the
omitted categories, OLS
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Table 5.5: Wealth, Hidden Wealth and the Proportion of Hidden Wealth as Predictors of Oxbridge
Attendance Rate 1990-2016
Oxbridge Attendance Rate (Z)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Wealth Percentile: 70-80 .098∗∗∗ .092∗∗∗ .096∗∗∗ .100∗∗∗ .099∗∗∗
(.022) (.022) (.022) (.022) (.022)
80-90 .124∗∗∗ .117∗∗∗ .122∗∗∗ .124∗∗∗ .124∗∗∗
(.023) (.023) (.023) (.023) (.023)
The Top 10% .263∗∗∗ .251∗∗∗ .259∗∗∗ .262∗∗∗ .263∗∗∗
(.024) (.024) (.024) (.024) (.024)
DHider .072
∗∗∗
(.017)
Hidden Wealth .035∗∗∗
(.007)
HW : 0-.2m .035
(.027)
HW : .2m-1m .051∗
(.025)
HW :>1m .167∗∗∗
(.033)
Prop. Hidden, α .100∗∗∗
(.027)
α: 0-.5 .064∗
(.025)
α .5-.75 .068∗
(.031)
α. 75-.9 .113∗∗
(.037)
α>.90 .051
(.042)
N2002 .002
∗∗∗ .002∗∗∗ .002∗∗∗ .002∗∗∗ .002∗∗∗
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Observations 18,921 18,921 18,921 18,921 18,921
R2 .041 .042 .042 .041 .042
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Wealth is in 2015 Pounds, Per Annum ﬂow.
No hidden wealth, α = 0 are the
omitted categories, OLS
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Notes: Calculated at the Rare Surname Level. Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.
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6 Conclusion
This paper introduces a method using historical data to detect hidden wealth at the surname level.
Tax authorities could use this method to investigate tax-evasion in England. Further, the method
could be applied to other sources in other countries, with the potential to uncover vast amounts of
hidden wealth.
In England, 1920-92, I ﬁnd 3,311 dynasties hiding £3 Billion.
The post-war era introduced wealth and death taxes suﬃcient to conﬁscate all elite wealth. Elites
responded rationally. The analysis revealed that the English elites are hiding about 20-32% of their
true inherited wealth. Hidden wealth, calculated from the pre-WWI era, has a strong eﬀect on the
probability of a surname appearing in the Offshore Leaks Database of 2013-6. Hidden wealth boosts
the value of hiding dynastyies’ homes in 1999, and their children’s chances of attending Oxbridge,
1990-2016.
Analyses of wealth-at-death reveal a secular observed decline in wealth inequality, driven by the
top 1%. However when I calculate the ‘true’ inherited wealth of English dynasties I ﬁnd that 33%
of the decline of the top 10% wealth-share can attributed to hidden wealth. This is a lower-bound
estimate. Future detailed research of individual dynasties could more precisely estimate the scale
of hidden wealth and, perhaps, reverse one of the great stylized facts of the 20th century.
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Table A.1: Wealth, Hidden Wealth and the Proportion of Hidden Wealth as Predictors of Presence
in the Paradise Papers
Paradise Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Wealth Percentile: 70-80 .002 −.001 .001 .002 .002
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008)
80-90 .007 .004 .007 .008 .008
(.008) (.008) (.008) (.008) (.008)
The Top 10% .041∗∗∗ .037∗∗∗ .040∗∗∗ .041∗∗∗ .041∗∗∗
(.009) (.009) (.009) (.009) (.009)
DHider .020
∗∗
(.006)
Hidden Wealth .007∗∗
(.002)
HW : 0-.2m .004
(.010)
HW : .2m-1m .025∗∗
(.009)
HW :>1m .036∗∗
(.012)
Prop. Hidden, α .033∗∗∗
(.010)
α: 0-.5 .011
(.009)
α .5-.75 .033∗∗
(.011)
α. 75-.9 .014
(.014)
α>.90 .029
(.015)
N2002 .001
∗∗∗ .001∗∗∗ .001∗∗∗ .001∗∗∗ .001∗∗∗
(.00004) (.00004) (.00004) (.00004) (.00004)
Constant .063∗∗∗ .068∗∗∗ .063∗∗∗ .063∗∗∗ .063∗∗∗
(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)
Observations 15,975 15,975 15,975 15,975 15,975
R2 .020 .020 .020 .020 .020
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Wealth is in 2015 Pounds, Per Annum ﬂow
No hidden wealth and α = 0 are the omitted categories
Hidden wealth is calculated 1980-92, estimated via OLS
Standard Errors in parantheses
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Table A.2: Hidden Wealth by Lineage, the top 50
Surname Hidden Wealth α N2002 DParadise Victorian Elite
Mxxxxxx 56,662,762 0.992 192 0 1
Axxxxxxxxx 37,881,553 0.985 81 0 1
Txxxxxxxxx 36,813,438 0.925 72 0 1
Txxxxxxxxxxxxx 28,182,689 0.986 28 0 1
Hxxxxxxx 25,525,283 0.963 84 0 1
Hxxx 24,067,787 0.917 134 1 1
Pxxxxx 20,565,130 0.997 36 1 1
Exxxxx 18,375,274 0.987 66 0 1
Txxxxx 17,413,324 0.985 75 0 1
Wxxxxx 16,472,154 0.881 135 0 1
Sxxxxxxxx 16,227,424 0.893 244 1 1
Vxxxx 16,209,211 0.890 116 0 1
Axxxxxxx 14,962,730 0.988 80 0 1
Mxxxxxxx 13,440,458 0.939 64 0 1
Wxxxxxxxx 13,180,048 0.987 63 0 1
Kxxxxx 13,126,538 0.857 176 1 1
Vxxxxx 12,923,619 0.825 35 0 1
Nxxxxxxxxx 12,843,163 0.985 42 1 1
Lxxxxxxxxx 12,832,084 0.985 93 1 1
Cxxxxxxx 12,814,435 0.935 54 0 1
Bxxxxxxx 12,784,589 0.994 91 0 1
Wxxxxxxxxxx 12,644,799 0.985 44 0 1
Pxxxx 12,306,241 0.933 85 0 1
Txxxxxxxxx 11,867,111 0.999 16 0 1
Cxxxx 11,479,812 0.912 180 0 1
Exxxxxxxx 11,200,291 0.978 61 0 1
Txxxxxxx 11,199,033 0.830 10 1 1
Mxxxxxx 11,135,647 0.835 39 0 1
Hxxxxxxx 10,880,556 0.757 7 0 1
Dxxxxxxx 10,588,493 0.886 145 0 1
Lxxxxxxx 10,036,708 0.944 90 0 1
Rxxxxx 10,020,063 0.955 73 0 1
Txxxxxx 10,002,901 0.946 74 0 1
Sxxxxxxxx 9,678,004 0.837 64 0 1
Mxxxxxx 9,457,449 0.992 11 1 1
Ixxxxx 9,426,180 0.855 198 0 1
Fxxxxx 8,983,592 0.899 88 0 1
Sxxxxx 8,940,986 0.951 77 1 1
Bxxxx 8,231,496 0.869 46 0 1
Yxxxxxx 8,199,986 0.960 38 1 1
Txxxxxxx 8,070,667 0.673 97 0 1
Zxxxxx 7,708,226 0.878 85 1 1
Sxxxxxxx 7,633,713 0.980 10 0 1
Bxxxxxxxx 7,572,820 0.977 0 0 1
Mxxxxx 7,551,155 0.982 36 0 1
Dxxxxxxxx 7,518,020 0.987 9 0 1
Sxxxxxxx 7,450,607 0.996 7 0 1
Pxxxxxxx 7,433,521 0.789 104 0 1
Sxxxx 7,293,531 0.894 333 0 1
Fxxx 7,206,546 0.939 66 1 1
Wealth is in £2015. Names are withheld. Annual ﬂow of £.
Years All Probated
1892-1980 0 0
1981 .13 .30
1982 .25 .55
1983 .27 .59
1984 .28 .63
1985 .23 .59
1986 .22 .56
1987 .23 .60
1988 .24 .63
1989 .25 .67
1990 .29 .77
1991 .30 .80
1992 .25 .84
Table A.3: Proportion of All Decedents and those Probated with Banded Probate Valuations
A.1 Banded Probate Valuations After 1980
After 1980 there was a change in the system for valuing probates in the calendars. As opposed to
an exact valuation, which was the practice 1892-1980, a proportion of valuations appear as bands.
Namely, these are £25,000, £40,000, £70,000, £100,000, £115,000 and £125,000 with each entry
listed as “Not Exceeding” the named amount. Table A.3 reports the overall incidence of the banded
values, 1892-1992. As noted in Cummins (2019)(see the discussion there in appendix A.1), it is
evident that these bands are loosely applied.
Where estate values are reported as a banded value, I generate a normally distributed random
number. This random number is calibrated on the observed data. For example, where the estate
value is listed as “£100,000”, I generate a random estate value with the observed means and standard
deviation of all non-banded estates under £100,000 and above £70,000 (the next lower band). Table
A.4 reports the attributed means and standard devotions for these estimates as well as the numbers
of observations transformed.
Table A.4: Attributing Ranged Random Values to Banded Probate Values, 1981-92
Band Mean SD N
25,000 9,096 6,502 291,105
40,000 32,401 4,353 546,098
70,000 54,913 8,670 265,861
100,000 84,833 8,596 148,498
115,000 113,947 7,211 164,913
125,000 120,236 2,921 244,297
A.2 Extra Results
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Figure A.2: Flow-Chart of Probate Data Generation
Notes: See Cummins (2019) for a detailed account of the source, construction and validation of the PPR data.
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Figure A.3: Estimated and Observed Lineage Wealth, with taxes paid, Victorian mid and bottom
Lineages
Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.
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Figure A.4: Example of Lineage Wealth by Rare Surname
Source: 100% PPR Calendar Sample.
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Table A.5: Wealth, Hidden Wealth and the Proportion of Hidden Wealth as Predictors of Presence
in the Paradise Papers, Alternative Wealth Controls
Paradise Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Observed Wealth 1.127 1.109 1.123 1.131 1.131
[3.829]∗∗∗ [3.338]∗∗∗ [3.695]∗∗∗ [3.938]∗∗∗ [3.926]∗∗∗
Observed Wealth Squared .998 .999 .998 .998 .998
[−1.368] [−.986] [−1.269] [−1.460] [−1.450]
Observed Wealth Cubed 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
[.645] [.330] [.563] [.726] [.717]
DHider 1.216
[3.123]∗∗
Hidden Wealth 1.048
[2.602]∗∗
HW : 0-.2m 1.034
[.318]
HW : .2m-1m 1.249
[2.558]∗
HW :>1m 1.418
[3.173]∗∗
Prop. Hidden, α 1.402
[3.495]∗∗∗
α: 0-.5 1.095
[1.001]
α .5-.75 1.356
[2.911]∗∗
α. 75-.9 1.204
[1.391]
α>.90 1.363
[2.094]∗
N2002 1.004 1.004 1.004 1.004 1.004
[13.785]∗∗∗ [13.635]∗∗∗ [13.809]∗∗∗ [13.824]∗∗∗ [13.822]∗∗∗
Observations 15,975 15,975 15,975 15,975 15,975
Log Likelihood -5,705.336 -5,706.928 -5,702.866 -5,704.227 -5,703.688
Akaike Inf. Crit. 11,422.670 11,425.860 11,421.730 11,420.450 11,425.380
Note: ∗p<.05; ∗∗p<.01; ∗∗∗p<.001
Wealth is in 2015 Pounds, Per Annum ﬂow
No hidden wealth and α = 0 are the omitted categories
Hidden wealth is calculated 1980-92, estimated via logistic regression
Odds Ratios are reported with t-stats in parantheses
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Table A.6: Examples of English Lineage Names Found in Paradise Papers
Name Source Hidden
Lineage
Wealth
α N,
2003
N,
Par-
adise
Victorian
Elite
XXX
XXXXXXXXX
Paradise Pa-
pers - Samoa
corporate
registry
2,283,369 0.59 209 13 1
XX.
XXXXXX
XXXXX
XXXXXXX
Panama Pa-
pers
858,169 0.88 52 3 1
XXXXXXXXX
XXXXXX
Paradise Pa-
pers - Malta
corporate
registry
190,674 0.79 21 2
XXXXXX
XXXX
XXXXXXXXX
Panama Pa-
pers
2,127,503 0.40 233 3 1
XXXXX
XXXXXXX
X.
Paradise Pa-
pers - Bar-
bados corpo-
rate registry
199,070 0.82 111 2
XXXXXX
XXXXXXXX
Paradise Pa-
pers - Bar-
bados corpo-
rate registry
95,132 0.25 168 4
XXXXXX
XXXX
XXXXXXXX
Paradise Pa-
pers - Bar-
bados corpo-
rate registry
1,255,102 0.96 132 2
XXXXXXX
XXXXXX
XXXXXXX
XXX
Paradise Pa-
pers - Ap-
pleby
83,087 0.32 29 4
Hidden Wealth is Annual Flow, in 2015 pounds
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